For Philosopher Rene Descartes, Life is but a Dream in His Meditation 1

Descartes undertakes an arduous task in his attempt to, "…establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences (The Meditations…)." In order to construct a foundation of the sciences, The Meditations on First Philosophy displays Descartes skepticism challenging all beliefs made to be knowledge. Two arguments propose the possibility that "all …(Descartes') opinions are false," and must be doubted in order to find absolute truths.


 


 


 


So that one may come to see that it is possible to deceive oneself in empirical knowledge, or that gained from the senses, Descartes offers the "dream argument." Secondly, even though there are certainties known regardless of unreliable senses, it is possible there is a force that deceives us further still. This second argument, enhancing the skepticism throughout, is the "evil demon argument."


 


 


 


Both these arguments make up what is titled, Meditation One, of the …First Philosophy writings. Descartes' reasoning convinces to the point of the oblivion of what can be known as certainty.


 


 


 


The beliefs in question for Descartes are those that the majority of minds cling to for scientific reassurance. This comfort is undermined by his arguments' "attack…" on the "...principles" of our claims to knowledge. Simply put, he poses the question of how can one be sure that what is believed to be known is true and certain? If one is to trust that the senses reveal how the world is and not how one believes it to be, it must come in the form of knowledge that is certain.


 


 


 


Most knowledge is derived from the senses and as realized in the "dream argument" may sometimes deceive us, thus making them unreliable. The "evil demon argument" becomes necessary when one comes to realize that these same senses convey matters that "one simply cannot doubt." To be able to doubt the senses is no small feat, as without them it would seem that we experience nothing and are useless. Once this doubt is in place, one can be equally skeptical of the knowledge derived thereof.