Soviet Foreign Policy in Iran: 1945-1979

James Harlon Williams characterizes Soviet foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region as a “product of historical experience.”[1] Historically, it followed a pattern or strategy of “expansion, consolidation, and preservation.”[2]As Imperial Russia expanded its borders during the course of the Great Game in Asia, it emerged as the most powerful Continental power in Central Asia. Quickly thereafter, moved to consolidate and preserve that power through political shoving matches with .[3]While the Russians significantly pushed their borders southwards towards , the British countered Russian influence in order to protect British India. The idea of as a “buffer” state acted as the way the British used to prevent Russian penetration towards the Persian Gulf.[4] Since the British resisted a stronger Russian presence in the Gulf, employed a series of proxy conflicts while averting war with . Playing a game of power politics dominated Russian and British diplomacy. From the mid-19th to the early 20th centuries both sides asserted their political dominance in . Their goal was to dominate the enemy as much as possible yet averting war at all costs. Engaging in a head to head war would not be beneficial to either or from an economic and military perspective. In doing so, the tsar abandoned hopes of obtaining a warm water port in the Gulf.[5]

Using the Great Game example in as a “20th Century Cold War” comparison, Stalinist foreign policy reflected a confrontational attitude to consolidate or ‘contain’ political influence within while shutting out Western influence.[6] “Containment,” not to be confused with the Truman Doctrine conceptualization of Soviet encirclement, meant the consolidation of Soviet influence over . This pro-Soviet relationship excludes Western influence. In doing so, the Soviets needed to protect their southern borders by creating a stronger with their help.