A Rational Cosmology: Can We Observe Others' Consciousness?

Essay LXXIX

This is Essay LXXIX of Mr. Stolyarov's series, "A Rational Cosmology," which seeks to present objective, absolute, rationally grounded views of terms such as universe, matter, volume, space, time, motion, sound, light, forces, fields, and even the higher-order concepts of life, consciousness, and volition. See the index of all the essays in "A Rational Cosmology" here.

Partly as a response to my essays on the physicalist view of life, consciousness, and volition, Reginald Firehammer has published the treatise, "Consciousness Itself," in which he presents, among other ideas, his rebuttal to the physicalist model of consciousness.

Within his arguments, Mr. Firehammer posits the notion that consciousness is inherently subjective and that no man could possibly know what another's consciousness is like. As I am an adherent of the physicalist view, I see fit in this essay to explicate my true position on consciousness.

I shall defend the proposition that consciousness, like all other aspects of reality, is objective, meaning that any individual, if he undertakes the required procedures, can understand what another's consciousness is like.

According to Mr. Firehammer, there is an inherent limit to what we may know about another's consciousness. He writes:

"Consciousness in other people and other creatures is inferred from their testimony (in the case of people) or their behavior (in the case of animals), but cannot be directly observed. We believe the testimony of others about their consciousness, because what they describe sounds exactly like what we experience, and we have no reason to suspect them of deceiving us. If someone were not conscious, it is unlikely they would attempt to fool others into thinking they were. If they were not conscious, how would they know what it is and what possible motive could they have for deceiving others about it?"