The New American Nationalism and Emerging Regionalism in the 1810s

The War Address of June 1812 by President James Madison to Congress revealed not only the ambivalent approach of Madison towards the “British problem,” but the statistical weakness of the American military against the British empire. Despite the overwhelming support of hawkish congressmen like Henry Clay of Kentucky, the Americans had a maximum of 7,000 troops, 17 naval ships, and around 5,000 privateers in the employ of the American government. The British, conversely, had over a thousand naval ships at their disposal as well as a strategic advantage in their colonial possession of Canada. Both sides, however, shared a significant weakness. The Americans were struggling economically with the British as their largest economic partner and the British were utilizing a great deal of resources to fight Napoleon’s forces in Europe.

While the Americans had the support of many southerners and westerners, the heavily Federalist New England states had strong dissension to fighting against the British. Along with protests in the North to the war, the Americans suffered early losses in their attempt to fight the British in Canada. Madison proved to be a poor war planner and the American military forces had devolved since their successes in the Revolutionary War. The Navy, however, began to spearhead the American war effort with successes in a dozen naval engagements in the Atlantic. The British were only truly successful in pushing through the Chesapeake Valley and destroying Washington, D.C., but their efforts to take the south were thwarted at New Orleans by Andrew Jackson and their attempt to take New York from Canada failed miserably. The heroics of Jackson and Oliver Hazzard Perry were enough to create a stronger sheen on the war effort despite many failed campaigns and stalemated battles.