Sectarian Violence Nothing New in Iraq

Even with the dreaded sectarian violence diminishing by more than noticeable margins to even the casual observer, it is often used as a rallying cry by anti-war vocalists, such as John Kerry who said that our troops are "caught up in the midst of a civil war". Perhaps the most common theme of this is the suggestion, as was the case by Imam Taha of the Islamic Center of San Diego, is that it is something new to Iraq, that somehow the invasion and establishment of the Iraqi National Assembly is what drove Sunnis and Shi'ites to hate one another, somehow neglecting the centuries of layered bloodshed over something as trivial as succession of clergy.

Something, anti-war critics accuse, happened where American soldiers somehow instigated a latent conflict that Saddam Hussein had somehow kept out of the population. A common suggestion is that, while a brutal tyrant, that tyranny kept the sectarian violence in order, and the factions could not battle one another under him.

This, however, is simply foolish. A reasonable understanding of Iraq displays that sectarian bloodshed is not a new, or recent development. It existed in Iraq's foundation, it existed before Iraq existed, and it existed throughout the entirety of the Saddam regime. The dynamic was shifted, naturally, because one of the sects was in power. With Saddam down, the position of boss was up for grabs, Muqtada al-Sadr felt, and this drives his bloodthirsty attacks across Iraq. The position was vacant, and he felt the position belonged to him, much like the warlords of Star Wars literature or the nobles of the Middle Ages. The throne lay dormant and the brutal war masters decided they would swoop in and take it with the might of their individual armies.

Even with the backing of Iran, however, the Mahdi Army has found itself foiled by a determined American defense, and the establishment of an Iraqi democracy that did not exist in the Middle Ages of similar scenarios that Muqtada and Ahmadinejad so badly want to recreate.