Groupthink May Have Played a Role in Minnesota Bridge Collapse

Now that all the known victims' bodies have been recovered from the Minneapolis bridge collapse, the investigation into what caused the bridge collapse has begun in earnest. Various causes are already being bandied about: fatigue cracks, corrosion, vibration, erosion, the "domino effect," the lack of a comprehensive transportation system, even the effects of ammonia and acids in pigeon droppings.

While all of these may be contributing factors, it is likely that the final answer will not be found solely in the twisted girders and concrete rubble, but also among the decision-making meetings of those responsible for the safety of public infrastructure in Minnesota. The reason is something called "Groupthink." First identified in the 1970's by renowned psychologist Dr. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink is a phenomenon in which group members' premature striving for agreement somehow overrides their ability to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.

In 1989, I worked with Dr. Janis to develop a training program to help organizational leaders and team members identify Groupthink and determine when it was affecting group decision making and, most importantly, how to avoid its devastating effects. That program, still in use in thousands of organizations today, profiled many examples of how Groupthink has led to hopelessly-flawed decisions and tragic outcomes, including Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs, and the Challenger Incident.

Could Groupthink have been a factor in the decisions that allowed a structurally-deficient bridge to remain in service despite repeated warnings over the years about its overall safety? Federal and state investigators should begin a parallel inquiry into the decision-making process that led up to, and may have contributed to, the bridge disaster. And not as a last resort but now, while participating decision makers' memories are fresh.

STRESSFUL CONTEXT