Obstacles to Functionalism: Chalmers' Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment
In order to see how Chalmers' argument works, it is necessary first to establish an understanding of functionalism. Functionalism understands brain states according to the functional role they play in a cognitive system. Hilary Putnam, in "The Nature of Mental States,"(1973) describes mental states in terms of the functional role they play in a computational system. A computational system is binary in that the input and the output of the system are both necessary and sufficient for the system's functional identity. The system is defined by what it is attuned for (that is, the input) and by what it yields, or produces (that is, the output). Putnam spells out his version of functionalism, bearing all of this in mind:
"All organisms capable of feeling pain are Probabilistic Automata.
Every organism capable of feeling pain possesses at least one Description of a certain kind (i.e., being capable of feeling pain is possessing an appropriate kind of Functional Organization.)
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