Denying Metaphysics, Questioning Knowledge

I. Clarifying the Position on Metaphysics

For the purpose of this argument into the reality of morality, it is imperative that I leave no assumptions and no stone unturned, so to speak. This piece depends heavily on my previously established premise that a move towards moral experiences grounded in reason, as is the case in moral rationalism or objective morality in general, and then it requires too much to be assumed and posited without probable cause. The case I will now address is why such problems of metaphysics are neither necessary nor helpful in moral inquiries, and why they should be dropped altogether. My goal here then is to clarify the uselessness of metaphysics, and then transition from empiricism (as a counter to moral rationalism), and move more directly into skepticism. This work is merely an outline, not an argument, as clarification.

Antimetaphysical positions have been somewhat of a tradition amongst linguistic analytic philosophers for many decades. In his work, Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer set out to understand philosophy as an activity concerned with the analysis and clarification of language. His thesis strips philosophy of metaphysics in general; he summarizes his thesis as follows:

"We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions; we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical" (Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, p.41).

Ayer has taken the stance that I have tried to enumerate previously, in that only statements that can reference our experiences are meaningful. Statements of a metaphysical nature, by their definition, cannot be verified as true or false.