An Analysis of Junior Officer Attrition Rates in the Army
For a quantitative comparative study, tabular data that graphically depicts the two variables is the most suitable technique for data analysis. However, there are some possible problems with the data collection methods contained in this paper.A major consideration for this study is the fact that much of the data is from official Army sources, and as such may be biased to present a particular view that the Army wishes to portray. Additionally, I have relied upon online information sources for all of the data that I have collected. I have been unable to locate any published books that analyze the data or seek to explain the effects of a high DEPTEMPO upon attrition rates.
So far, I have been able to locate statistical data on deployment tempo and attrition rates for each of the years from 1996 to 2001. With the launching of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army implemented a “Stop Loss” program that effectively stopped voluntary attrition for Army officers in order to provide the Army the ability to meet manning requirements for ongoing contingency operations. There is no concrete way to make a valid estimation of potential officer attrition rates for years beyond 2001 because the “Stop Loss” program only allows involuntary separations (physically unfit, overweight, bad conduct, etc.).
Data Presentation and Analysis
The following table depicts Army officer attrition rates for the calendar years from 1996 through 2001. The table contains officer ranks from lieutenant through colonel and depicts the percentage of officers at those ranks who voluntarily chose to leave military service during a given calendar year. Entries of “N/A” indicate that data for that particular cell of the table was not available.
Officer Attrition Rates by Rank and by Calendar Year
1996-2001 (% leaving Army service)
Rank 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Lieutenant 6.3 4.3 4.7 6.1 N/A N/A
Captain 7.2 8.4 10.6 10.9 11.6 10.9
Major 5.5 4.2 3.5 4.1 3.3 N/A
Lieutenant Colonel 9.9 11.1 12.5 13.3 13.2 N/A
Colonel 13.6 16.3 18.7 20.0 19.8 N/A
Source: Briefing Presented to the Security for a New Century Discussion Group of the 107th Congress, compiled by Mark Lewis, <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c426.htm>
The table indicates an attrition rate for captain-level Army officers that steadily increases from 1996 through 2000, and then dips slightly in 2001. Although there is a slight dip in the captain-level attrition rate for the year 2001, the attrition rate remained higher than pre-draw down attrition rate levels. During the Army-wide draw down from 1989 through 1995, the Army had an average captain-level junior officer attrition rate of 6.5 percent, and that was during a period when the Army was trying to entice its personnel to leave military service to meet downsizing requirements (Lewis, 2003). Additionally, it is still well above the 7.5 percent attrition rate that most military leaders find manageable (Carter, 2002).
The below table depicts the number of Army personnel deployed away from home station in support of contingency
operations for the calendar years from 1996 through 2001.
Year DEPTEMPO
1996 30,000
1997 12,000
1998 14,000
1999 13,000
2000 15,000
2001 12,000
Source: The Global War on Terrorism: An Early Look at Implications for the Army, compiled by Bruce Nardulli of the Rand Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB416/DB416.pdf>
This table depicts that While the Army had 30,000 personnel deployed during 1996, that number was cut by half or more in the subsequent years through 2001. The year 1996 featured the end of the major deployment in Bosnia and a drastic reduction in Army forces in that region. Subsequent years were subject to an increased number of operational deployments, as is indicated in various studies, but these deployments appear to be smaller in size. The number of deployed Army personnel between 1997 and 2001 remained relatively constant.
To review, examination of the first table reveals that lieutenant-level officer attrition rates fluctuated from between 4.3 percent in 1997 and 6.3 percent in 1996, with the years 1998 and 1999 somewhere in between. Lieutenants were not a focus of this study because typical active duty service obligations (ADSOs) generally keep lieutenants on active military for four years, at which time they are promoted to captain. Therefore, increases or decreases in lieutenant-level attrition rates would not support or refute this paper’s stated hypothesis.
The table further reveals that captain-level officer attrition rates steadily increased from 7.2 percent to 11.6 percent between the years 1996 and 2000. The captain-level attrition rate then dipped in the year 2001 to 10.9 percent, a figure still well above the Army’s pre-draw down attrition rate of 6.5 percent. This data confirms that the dependent variable (captain-level attrition rate) did increase between 1996 and 2001, as suggested by the hypothesis of this paper. However, this table alone does not provide explanation for the increase in captain-level attrition.
Additionally, the attrition rate for major-level officers remained fairly constant, with a low rate of 3.3 percent in 2000 and a high rate of 5.5 percent in 1996. The probable reason for a steady attrition rate (and a low one) among majors is that officers at this level typically have between 11 and 15 years of service and are well on their way to the retirement benefits offered for 20 years of active military duty. A noticeable increase in major-level officer attrition would have served to confirm or support this paper’s hypothesis. A similar statement may be made for the data on lieutenant colonels and colonels. While the attrition rates for lieutenant colonels and colonels may appear high when compared with the rates for lieutenants, captains, and majors, it is important to remember that officers in these ranks typically have 20 or more years of active military service and are eligible for retirement at a time of their choosing.
Examination of the second table reveals that during the years from 1997 through 2001, the Army deployed anywhere from 12,000 to 15,000 of its personnel in support of contingency operations around the world. In 1996, the deployment tempo was double that of the subsequent period, probably as a result of the ongoing operations in Bosnia during that year.
Conclusion
Based on the data contained in the above tables, there is no reason to believe that a causal relationship exists between the Army’s increased deployment tempo and increased rate of captain-level officer attrition between 1996 and 2001. The DEPTEMPO table demonstrates that between the target years of 1996 and 2001, the number of deployed Army personnel remained relatively constant at approximately 3 percent of the Army’s authorized strength of 480,000 soldiers. The consistency in deployment tempo does not correspond to the increase in captain-level officer attrition for the period from 1996 through 2001. The data contained in this study do not support the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between the Army’s deployment tempo and increased captain attrition. Still, the attrition rate table demonstrates that there was a steady increase in captain-level officer attrition between the years 1996 and 2001, a rate that was well above pre-draw down levels.
This study recommends further investigation and continued study of the reasons for the increased level of captain attrition since the end of the Army draw down in 1995. As mentioned in this study, the Army has acknowledged that today’s soldiers are doing more with less and that an increased rate of operational deployments will continue for the foreseeable future. These deployments have proven to be small, specialized missions that draw upon particular expertise, such as Special Forces and aviation soldiers. Further study is recommended to determine if captain attrition in high demand career fields is a result of the increased number of specialized deployments since the end of the Army draw down.
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