The Man Who Never Was

In May of 1943 Hitler declared to his Generals a new fear: the loss of the Balkans. The Balkan States (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and the European portion of Turkey) were all either countries occupied by the Nazis or Allies of the Axis. Hitler felt that the countries could provide long-lasting raw materials for Germany: copper, bauxite, chrome and most importantly Romanian oil. But he may have also had a fear that the Western Allies might try the same World War I strategy of a decisive attack through the Balkan Peninsula.

Western Allied intelligence was aware of Hitler's concerns. However, by May of 1943, the next step had been decided: an attack through Italy. On June 11, 1943 the Allies captured the small island of Pantelleria. It would seem at this point that the Germans would conclude that Italy would be attacked and the Balkans were safe.

The London Controlling Section (LCS - responsible for devising deceptive schemes) prepared to mislead Hitler into believing an attack on Sicily was too obvious. He would need to be led to think that the Allies would invade both Greece, for a thrust into the Balkans, and Sardinia as a stepping stone to the south of France. The deception was devised. It was code named "Trojan Horse."

Though "Trojan Horse" was an appropriate name, the operation would eventually take on the more famous title of "The Man Who Never Was," and be recognized as one of history's greatest pieces of deceptive espionage.

The idea was old: place false papers in the hands of the enemy in hopes they would believe the information true and act on it. It was a strategy that had been used effectively for centuries, especially for Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen and Brigadier Archibald Wavel during the British campaign against the Turks and Germany in World War I. Their success inspired Churchill and was principle in his creation of the LCS.